THE CASPIAN’S NEW ROLE: WHERE THE INTERESTS OF CENTRAL ASIAN STATES AND AZERBAIJAN CONVERGE

For much of the post-Soviet period, the Caspian Sea was treated as a buffer zone rather than a strategic space in its own right. Wedged between larger powers and overshadowed by established export routes, the region rarely featured as a central element of Eurasian connectivity. That perception is now changing. Shifting energy flows, transport diversification, and mounting environmental pressures are transforming the Caspian into a functional hub linking Central Asia with Europe and the Middle East. At the center of this shift lies the growing convergence of interests between Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states.

The transformation of global energy and transport chains since 2022 has significantly increased the value of alternative routes that bypass traditional chokepoints. For landlocked Central Asia, access to diversified corridors has become not only an economic priority but a strategic necessity. Azerbaijan, positioned between the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, is emerging as a key connector in this evolving architecture.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian region evolved from an internal sea shared by two states into a multilateral space involving five littoral countries. The signing of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in 2018 provided a long-awaited legal framework governing security, economic activity, and the use of the seabed. While the convention did not resolve all outstanding issues, it significantly reduced legal uncertainty and created a more predictable environment for regional cooperation.

Energy remains one of the most visible areas where Azerbaijani and Central Asian interests intersect. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan possess substantial hydrocarbon reserves, yet all face similar constraints: high dependence on limited export routes and exposure to geopolitical risks. Diversification, therefore, has become a shared strategic objective.

In this context, Turkmenistan’s recent efforts to expand gas exports beyond the Chinese market are particularly instructive. In 2024–2025, Ashgabat explored swap arrangements involving Iran, under which Turkmen gas was supplied to northern Iranian provinces while equivalent volumes were delivered onward to end consumers. According to Reuters, one of the proposed schemes involved gas deliveries to Iraq via Iran, amounting to approximately 5 billion cubic meters annually. While political and sanctions-related constraints complicated implementation, the initiative itself underscored a broader trend: Central Asian producers are increasingly seeking flexible, multi-directional export options that do not rely on single corridors.

These energy dynamics are closely linked to developments in transport and logistics. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor, connects China and Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and the South Caucasus. As congestion and political risks affect northern and southern routes, the Middle Corridor has gained prominence as a viable alternative. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has noted steady growth in cargo volumes along this route between 2022 and 2024, highlighting its rising importance for Eurasian trade diversification.

Azerbaijan plays a central role in this process. Its ports, rail infrastructure, and connectivity through the South Caucasus position it as a critical transit state across the Caspian. For Central Asian countries—particularly Kazakhstan—the route offers not only commercial opportunities but also strategic flexibility. Reuters reports that Kazakhstan has increased oil shipments across the Caspian Sea for onward transportation via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, explicitly viewing this corridor as an alternative to more traditional export channels.

Beyond energy and transport, environmental challenges are adding urgency to regional cooperation. The Caspian Sea is experiencing a steady decline in water levels, driven by climate change and human activity. According to data cited by Reuters and the United Nations Environment Programme, the sea level has fallen by more than two meters since the mid-2000s, with annual decreases reaching 20–30 centimeters in some years. These changes are already affecting navigation, port infrastructure, and coastal ecosystems, turning environmental sustainability into a shared regional concern rather than a secondary issue.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the Caspian is no longer merely a geographical boundary. It is becoming a strategic interface where the interests of Azerbaijan and Central Asian states increasingly overlap across energy, transport, and environmental governance. The diversification of Turkmenistan’s gas strategies, the expansion of the Middle Corridor, and Azerbaijan’s growing role as a transit hub all point to the same conclusion: the Caspian is evolving into one of Eurasia’s key connective nodes.

As global economic and political uncertainties persist, the ability of Azerbaijan and Central Asia to cooperate within the Caspian framework will play a significant role in shaping the region’s resilience and autonomy. The Caspian’s future, therefore, is not defined by its geography alone, but by how effectively regional actors leverage their converging interests in an increasingly fragmented world.

Meruyert Shakirova