MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS AND TURKMEN GAS: THE RISKS OF THE IRANIAN ROUTE

In 2025, Turkmenistan began exporting natural gas via Iran to Turkey and Iraq. This move reflected Ashgabat’s clear ambition to reduce its dependence on China and access new markets. However, military clashes between Iran and Israel have cast serious doubt on the reliability of this route. As geopolitical tensions escalate, the transit of Turkmen gas through Iranian territory has turned into a path riddled with risks.

The agreement between Turkmenistan and Iran is based on a gas swap scheme: Turkmenistan supplies gas to northern Iran, and Tehran, in return, delivers the same volume to Iraq. While this appears to be an efficient and flexible mechanism, threats to Iranian infrastructure and the country’s own energy shortages have revealed the scheme’s vulnerabilities. For instance, the intensification of U.S. sanctions forced Iraq to withdraw from the plan, while potential attacks on Iran’s energy system (for example, by Israel) could break the swap chain entirely. In such a scenario, Turkmenistan may struggle to fulfill its contractual obligations, potentially damaging its international reputation.

What alternative routes should Ashgabat consider in this context? The Chinese direction remains the most reliable and stable, yet Turkmenistan is heavily dependent on a single buyer in this case. Beijing, as the sole purchaser—a textbook case of monopsony—sets prices and contract terms to its advantage. This significantly limits Turkmenistan’s bargaining power and deepens its economic dependency.

At the regional level, routes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are more logistically feasible and politically safer. According to expert John Roberts, Tashkent has shown growing interest in Turkmen gas, but Ashgabat has so far refrained from taking proactive steps. While regional gas exports may seem simpler from a logistics and political standpoint, this path has its own constraints. First and foremost, the regional gas market is small and seasonal. Countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are experiencing growing domestic demand, particularly during the winter months when gas shortages are common. For example, Uzbekistan may request Turkmen gas in winter, but consumption drops sharply in summer—making exports irregular and seasonal.

Moreover, regional energy integration remains weak. Key mechanisms—such as price coordination, infrastructure modernization, and creation of joint operators—are not fully in place. Turkmenistan itself has shown little enthusiasm for regional initiatives, which undermines trust and complicates negotiations. Infrastructure limitations further compound the issue: existing pipelines have limited capacity and require upgrades. There are also no direct transit routes to Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan. Most importantly, regional gas trade depends heavily on intergovernmental political agreements. A competitive, open market has yet to emerge, reducing the predictability and stability of supply. Additionally, the influence of Russia and China looms large. For instance, China prefers to receive Turkmen gas directly and is unlikely to support its re-export through third countries.

The long-discussed Trans-Caspian pipeline is seen as the boldest and most strategic option for reaching European markets. Yet, several significant obstacles hinder its realization. Chief among them is the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea. Although the 2018 Convention was a breakthrough, Russia and Iran continue to oppose the project on environmental grounds. Furthermore, such a pipeline would compete with Russian gas in Europe, prompting Moscow to exert indirect pressure to preserve its influence. While the European Union supports the project as part of its broader energy diversification strategy, a lack of concrete investment and political will remains a major barrier. Technical challenges and underdeveloped infrastructure within Turkmenistan also complicate implementation.

The geopolitical standoff between Iran and Israel presents a serious challenge to Turkmenistan’s ambitions to export gas through Iran. For neutral Ashgabat, the situation signals the need to reassess its external flexibility and strengthen its energy security through new regional and trans-regional partnerships.

This moment presents not only risks for Turkmenistan—but also opportunities. It is a chance for Ashgabat to diversify its export strategy, enhance its risk management culture, and establish pragmatic dialogue with neighboring countries. Regionally, it is imperative to work toward genuine gas market integration, improve technical and infrastructural compatibility, and build stable, long-term agreements. The Trans-Caspian route, meanwhile, must remain a long-term strategic priority—Turkmenistan’s gateway back into the broader Eurasian energy landscape.

Ashgabat’s next move will determine not only its role as a gas supplier but also its identity as a political actor. Today’s turbulent geopolitical climate is a historic test of Turkmenistan’s diplomatic flexibility and resilience.

  Olzhas Baisalbek