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MILITARY ESCALATION AROUND IRAN AND ITS REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES: STRATEGIC RISKS FOR AZERBAIJAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

On February 28, 2026, the armed forces of Israel, with U.S. support, launched missile and air strikes against Iranian territory as part of Operation “Roaring Lion,” which Tel Aviv presents as a preventive action aimed at undermining Tehran’s missile and nuclear capabilities. Explosions were reported in Tehran, Isfahan, and several other major cities. Iran responded with missile and drone strikes against Israeli targets, as well as against U.S. and allied facilities in the Middle East. Israel declared a state of emergency, closed its airspace, and canceled civilian flights, which immediately affected the region’s logistics and aviation map. The escalation goes beyond the Middle Eastern theatre and requires an assessment of its impact on the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Azerbaijan: balance under pressure

Azerbaijan sits at the intersection of several geopolitical axes. It borders Iran, is deepening military cooperation with Israel and Turkey, while also maintaining pragmatic economic ties with Tehran. In the context of open military confrontation between Iran and Israel and the United States, this multi-vector balance becomes a source of vulnerability. The demographic factor is particularly significant. Iran hosts a substantial Azerbaijani population, estimated by various sources at 15-18 million up to 30 million people, making it the largest ethnic community after Persians. Under military escalation, the risk of intensified ethno-political rhetoric increases both in Iran and in Azerbaijan. This heightens sensitivities in border regions and complicates the management of public sentiment. An additional layer of risk stems from Tehran’s persistent suspicions that Azerbaijani territory could be used by Israel for intelligence activities or operations against Iran. Even with Baku’s official position denying involvement, information campaigns and accusations may be employed as instruments of pressure. In this situation, Azerbaijan must combine enhanced border security and defense readiness with calibrated diplomacy. The key task is to avoid being drawn into a proxy configuration and to minimize the risk of its territory becoming an object of political accusations or military signaling.

Central Asia: logistics, energy, geopolitics

For Central Asian states, the consequences are indirect but systemic in nature. Logistics. Iran is an important link in the International North–South Transport Corridor, which provides access to ports in the Persian Gulf. Military activity, risks of strikes near infrastructure, and rising insurance premiums reduce the attractiveness of the southern route. This objectively strengthens interest in the Trans-Caspian “Middle Corridor” through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. However, the growing role of alternative routes runs into infrastructure constraints: port capacity, tariff synchronization, and the digitalization of customs procedures. Without accelerated modernization, the region will not be able to fully compensate for a potential disruption of the Iranian direction. Energy. Destabilization around Iran increases volatility in global oil and gas prices. For Kazakhstan, this may mean a short-term rise in export revenues, while simultaneously intensifying inflationary pressures and increasing logistics costs. Additional sanctions against Iran could indirectly affect Central Asian actors involved in projects linked to Iranian infrastructure or transit through Iranian territory. Geopolitical pressure. The conflict intensifies competition among external actors for influence in Central Asia. China, deeply interested in the stability of transport corridors within the Belt and Road Initiative, may step up diplomatic and economic initiatives and expand its economic presence in the region. Russia seeks to preserve its role as a security guarantor in the post-Soviet space. The United States, being involved in the operation against Iran, may increase diplomatic engagement with Central Asian capitals in line with energy and transport diversification. As a result, the strategic maneuvering space for regional states narrows: they must balance among multiple centers of power, avoiding direct involvement in anti-Iran coalitions.

Humanitarian risks: potential pressure on Mangystau Region

Military escalation increases the likelihood of migration flows. At the initial stage, internal displacement within Iran is likely to dominate; however, if the conflict drags on, attempts by parts of the population to leave the country may emerge. For Kazakhstan, the Caspian and Turkmen directions may become potentially significant. Despite geographic barriers and controlled borders, a scenario of gradually increasing migration pressure cannot be ruled out. The “Iran–Turkmenistan–Caspian–Mangystau Region” linkage could theoretically become a transit or irregular migration route involving smuggling networks. Even moderate projections implying the movement of tens or hundreds of thousands of people in the event of a prolonged conflict would pose a serious challenge to reception infrastructure and security systems in destination and transit countries. In this context, Kazakhstan needs preventive interagency plans: strengthened border control, readiness of migration services, deployment of temporary reception centers, and coordination with international organizations. Particular attention should be given to the Mangystau Region as a Caspian area already experiencing pressure from transit flows and economic volatility. The existence of pre-agreed protocols for interaction between central authorities and local administrations will help reduce the risk of social tension in the event of a sharp increase in arrivals.

Transit opportunities and structural constraints

At the same time, the crisis creates incentives to accelerate the development of routes minimally dependent on Iranian territory. For Azerbaijan, this is an opportunity to reinforce its status as a logistics hub between Central Asia and Europe. For Kazakhstan, it is a chance to strengthen the transit role of the ports of Aktau and Kuryk. However, this window of opportunity comes with constraints: the need for investment, coordination of tariff policy, digitalization of procedures, and the removal of bureaucratic barriers. Without institutional synchronization, the region will not be able to fully benefit from the redistribution of cargo flows.

Practical takeaways

Military escalation around Iran significantly changes the regional security and economic landscape.

For Azerbaijan, the priority becomes a de-escalation strategy: balanced public rhetoric, enhanced defense readiness, and diplomatic channels with Tehran, Ankara, Washington, and Moscow.

For Central Asian states, the priority is accelerating the diversification of logistics routes and developing mechanisms to manage sanctions-related and insurance risks. For Kazakhstan, the priority is preparing humanitarian scenarios including potential pressure on the Mangystau Region through clear interagency planning.

Thus, the crisis around Iran is simultaneously a source of threats and a catalyst for strategic reassessment of regional security from border protection and migration policy to the development of alternative transport corridors and a new configuration of the balance of power in the Caspian space.

 

Meruyert Shakirova