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WHY CENTRAL ASIA NEEDS AZERBAIJAN: FROM THE CASPIAN TO A NEW REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE

In the previous article, we examined the Caspian Sea as a strategic interface where the interests of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states converge in the fields of energy, transport, and environmental governance. The next logical step is to ask: if the Caspian is becoming a regional node, who is capable of turning this node into a functioning mechanism that provides Central Asia with access to new routes, markets, and formats of autonomy?

Increasingly, the answer points to Azerbaijan. For the states of Central Asia, it acts not only as a Caspian neighbor, but also as a key operator of the Middle Corridor, a partner in export diversification, and a political “bridge” connecting the region with the South Caucasus and Türkiye.

1. Logistics and Connectivity: Central Asia’s Gateway to the World Runs Through Baku

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor, links China and Central Asia with Europe via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and the South Caucasus. In recent years, it has moved beyond being a “paper alternative” and has become one of the key instruments reshaping Eurasian connectivity amid constraints on northern and southern routes.

The defining feature of this route is that it is not limited to the Caspian maritime segment. Its viability depends on Azerbaijan’s ability to transform transit into an integrated logistics service. Azerbaijani port and railway infrastructure along the Baku–Georgia–Türkiye axis has reduced delivery times along the Middle Corridor to 18–23 days, compared to the previous 38–53 days, with a target of 14–18 days by the middle of the decade.

For Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states, this represents not merely an additional route, but a genuine window to Europe and the Middle East that does not rely on transit through Russian territory. As transport volumes increase, the Middle Corridor becomes a tool of foreign policy maneuvering: the greater the share of cargo routed through Baku, the broader the space for multivector diplomacy in the region.

2. Energy and Diversification: A Shared Strategic Demand

In the energy sector, the interests of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan largely converge. All three possess significant hydrocarbon reserves while simultaneously facing vulnerabilities associated with export bottlenecks and external shocks. Against this backdrop, diversification of export routes—from pipelines to maritime and rail transit has become a shared strategic priority.

In recent years, Kazakhstan has steadily increased oil shipments across the Caspian Sea for onward transportation via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, thereby reducing dependence on routes passing through Russian territory. According to KazTransOil, Kazakh oil exports via BTC rose from approximately 250 thousand tons in 2022 to around 1.392 million tons in 2023 an increase of more than fivefold.

Political statements underscore the long-term nature of this shift. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has publicly instructed to expand oil transportation along the Trans-Caspian corridor, while negotiations between the national companies of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan envisage further increases in volumes through BTC and related routes.

For Turkmenistan, which is actively seeking to reduce its one-sided dependence on the Chinese direction, the Azerbaijani vector is also becoming part of a broader multivector strategy from swap arrangements with Iran to the potential use of Caspian infrastructure to access western and southern markets. In this configuration, Azerbaijan acts not as a competitor but as a diversification partner, providing access to existing routes to Europe and integrating energy flows into a wider transport and logistics framework.

3. The Environmental Dimension: Shared Constraints as a Driver of Cooperation

The environmental agenda further aligns the interests of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states along the Caspian track. The declining water level of the Caspian Sea is already affecting navigation, ports, and coastal ecosystems, generating a shared set of risks for all littoral states.

Studies based on satellite monitoring and assessments by the UN Environment Programme indicate that the Caspian Sea level fell by approximately two meters from the mid-2000s to the mid-2020s, with a trend toward further decline if current climate patterns persist. While projections vary, some scenarios suggest a potential reduction of the sea’s surface area by up to one quarter by the end of the century, directly affecting logistics, energy infrastructure, and coastal communities.

For Central Asia, this means that the sustainability of Caspian routes is not merely a matter of investing in ports and railways, but also one of collective environmental risk management in cooperation with Azerbaijan. In this context, Baku becomes not just a transit partner, but a co-stakeholder in preserving the Caspian’s functionality as a key link in Eurasian connectivity.

4. Political and Symbolic Dimensions: Azerbaijan as “Almost Central Asia”

At the level of political practice and perception, Azerbaijan is increasingly moving beyond the traditional category of the “South Caucasus” and is more often viewed as part of an expanded Central Asia–Caspian–Türkiye space. This is reinforced by Baku’s participation in regional initiatives aimed at strengthening connectivity with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as its commitment to a multivector foreign policy logic similar to that of Kazakhstan.

Azerbaijan structures its relations with Türkiye, Russia, the EU, and Central Asian states to maximize its transit and energy potential without locking itself into rigid alliance frameworks. As a result, it becomes not only a logistics hub for Central Asia, but also an example of how a medium-sized state can convert geography into a source of political autonomy.

In policy debates, this increasingly gives rise to ideas of “Central Asia plus Azerbaijan” formats, where Baku is conceptualized as a natural extension of the Caspian arc rather than an external platform. For Central Asia, such formats open space for discussing not only bilateral ties, but also a shared architecture of resilience within the “Central Asia – Caspian – South Caucasus” triangle.

Toward a Regional Map Where Azerbaijan Is Not the Periphery

When logistics, energy, and political-environmental dimensions are considered together, a relatively coherent image emerges of Azerbaijan as a regional node without which a new architecture of Central Asia’s connectivity to the outside world remains incomplete. In this framework, the Caspian ceases to be a “sea in between” and becomes a space of intersecting interests and vulnerabilities, while Azerbaijan emerges as the actor capable of transforming these intersections into functioning routes, projects, and institutions.

For the states of Central Asia, the question “Do we need Azerbaijan?” is gradually being replaced by a more precise one: “What role are we prepared to assign to Azerbaijan in our own regional strategy?” The answer will determine whether the new regional map—Central Asia, the Caspian, and the South Caucasus becomes a source of resilience rather than merely another set of risks.

Meruyert Shakirova