TRANSIT AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL SUBJECTIVITY: IRAN AND CENTRAL ASIA IN EURASIAN LOGISTICS
In recent years, the transformation of the global trade and transport system has significantly altered the geo-economic configuration of Eurasia, elevating East–West and North–South land corridors to the forefront of international competition. The escalation of geopolitical conflicts, growing uncertainty surrounding the functioning of the traditional Northern Corridor through Russia and Belarus, increasing risks associated with maritime shipping, and sanctions pressure on certain states have accelerated the search for alternative routes between East Asia and Europe. Under these conditions, the Islamic Republic of Iran has intensified its transport diplomacy with Central Asian countries, seeking to convert its geographical position into a sustainable transit asset and to consolidate its role as a system-forming hub of Eurasian logistics.
Despite continued economic pressure from the United States and the persistence of international sanctions, Iran has consistently developed a network of transport partnerships with neighboring states, particularly the five Central Asian republics. The development of transit infrastructure is viewed by Tehran not only as an economic priority but also as an instrument of strategic adaptation to external isolation, enabling integration into alternative formats of regional cooperation. For Central Asian states, cooperation with Iran reflects a pragmatic strategy of diversifying external economic ties and reducing dependence on a limited number of routes exposed to political and infrastructural risks.
A key element of this dynamic is the formation of the Southern Transport Corridor, connecting China and Central Asia with Turkey, Europe, and the Indian Ocean through Iranian territory. Its development takes place within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, which Iran officially joined following the signing of a long-term strategic agreement with China. The war in Ukraine, heightened maritime tensions, and the narrowing capacity of the northern Eurasian route have compelled China to accelerate the diversification of its overland routes to Europe, providing additional momentum to both the Middle and Southern corridors. Unlike the multimodal Middle Corridor, the route through Iran has the potential to develop into a monomodal railway connection, significantly reducing transaction costs and increasing logistical predictability, particularly for containerized cargo.
Against this backdrop, a short-term increase in transit activity on Iran’s railway network has been recorded, reflecting the country’s growing importance in regional logistics. According to the Iranian Railway Company, freight volumes increased by approximately 20 percent over a twenty-day period. During this time, freight trains originating from China, Russia, and Belarus transited Iranian territory, indicating the existence of stable railway links between Iran and key Eurasian partners. At present, Iran maintains direct railway connections with China, Russia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Belarus, ensuring the continuity of international freight flows.
The growth in transit volumes has been facilitated by institutional coordination among railway authorities, customs administrations, and other relevant agencies, as well as by expanded cooperation with foreign representatives and private logistics operators. According to official statistics, approximately five million tons of cargo were transported via Iran’s railways during the Iranian calendar year from March 2024 to March 2025, with nearly half of this volume accounted for by transit shipments. These figures confirm the gradual strengthening of Iran’s role as a transit hub and reflect the redistribution of overland freight flows between East Asia, Eurasia, and the Middle East.
Iran’s transport strategy is focused on eliminating infrastructural gaps and creating continuous railway routes from the borders of Central Asia to Turkey and onward to Europe. Railway modernization projects in the country’s northwest and along the Iran–Turkmenistan border aim to increase capacity and remove bottlenecks. In parallel, Central Asian states’ access to Iran’s southern ports—most notably Chabahar and Bandar Abbas—is expanding, enhancing their outlets to the Indian Ocean and reinforcing the importance of the North–South axis in regional logistics. As a result, transit through Iran is becoming a multidimensional route that integrates East–West and North–South flows within a single transport space.
Within this configuration, Central Asia emerges not as a passive transit zone but as an active participant in shaping a new Eurasian transport architecture. Uzbekistan views the Southern Corridor as a potential driver of economic growth through the export of transport services and the reduction of logistics costs, particularly in the context of the prospective completion of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. Kazakhstan, while developing the Middle Corridor, is simultaneously interested in alternative routes through Iran, allowing it to maintain strategic flexibility and a multi-vector foreign policy. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are also intensifying cooperation with Tehran, regarding Iranian infrastructure as a means of overcoming transport isolation.
In a broader geopolitical context, the development of the Southern Corridor reflects deeper coordination among Iran, China, and Russia amid the formation of a multipolar international order. The integration of Iranian routes with China’s initiatives and the International North–South Transport Corridor creates an alternative network of transit routes that partially bypass traditional maritime and Western-controlled pathways. This, in turn, intensifies strategic competition over Eurasian transport infrastructure, where economic efficiency is closely intertwined with issues of security and political influence.
Despite its considerable potential, the implementation of the Southern Corridor faces a number of structural constraints, including sanctions-related risks, fragmented regulatory regimes, differences in technical standards, and persistent border bottlenecks. An additional source of uncertainty remains Iran’s internal and regional stability, which directly affects perceptions of the route’s reliability and long-term viability. Under these conditions, Central Asian states are compelled to balance among various external actors, seeking to maximize benefits from corridor competition without rigid alignment with any single geopolitical pole.
Overall, the activation of Iran’s transport diplomacy and the deepening of cooperation with Central Asian countries indicate the emergence of a new model of Eurasian interdependence, in which transit becomes a key element of economic resilience and political agency. The Southern railway corridor has the potential to become one of the most predictable overland routes between East Asia and Europe; however, its long-term sustainability will depend not only on infrastructure investments but also on the ability of participating states to institutionalize cooperation and collectively manage geopolitical risks.
Farangis Kydyrbek